If not this World Trade Organisation, then what? by Macmillan, Fiona
Introduction
In its relatively short life, the World Trade Organ-
isation (WTO) has come in for brief praise and a
remarkable barrage of criticism. Most of the pub-
licly expressed praise is located somewhere within
the mantra that ‘‘weneed international trade rules’’.
Criticism of the WTO, on the other hand, is diverse.
It is made from a wide range of perspectives that
embrace, at one end of the spectrum, the view
that the WTO and/or trade liberalisation is an
inherently undesirable thing, to, at the other end,
a criticism of the WTO based on its failure to
achieve sufficient trade liberalisation. At the recent
Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancu´n, the
negotiatingpositionsofmemberstates andaspirant
members ranged across this spectrum. As might be
expected, no state appeared to embrace the extreme
anti-WTOoranti-liberalisationposition.However,
there was considerable resistance to further liber-
alisation in some sectors, motivated either by con-
cerns about its economic and social effects or by the
desire to secure tit-for-tat liberalisation. While op-
position to trade liberalisation was generally quali-
fied, a strong pro-liberalisation position was in
evidence. It appears, in fact, that the failure of the
MinisterialConference toachievea final consensus
in the form of a substantive Ministerial Declaration
is largely a consequence of developed-country dis-
satisfaction with the lack of liberalisation.1
This article considers a range of interrelated
criticisms that have been made of the WTO. The
concern of the article is not only with criticisms
emanating from the pro- and anti-liberalisation
camps; it also discusses what might be described
as politico-structural objections to the WTO. In
assessing these criticisms and objections, reference
is made to the negotiating positions of some of the
WTO member states, especially as those positions
manifested themselves at Cancu´n. The article at-
tempts to assess the validity of the various argu-
ments with a view to determining the way forward.
If the WTO, in its current manifestation, is para-
lysed by the intransigence of its member states and
stigmatised by opposition from a wide range of
interest groups, is there any approach to the cre-
ationof international trade rules thatmight serve us
better?
Why not this WTO?
As the following discussion demonstrates in a
number of places, the enterprise of dividing the
anti-WTOarguments into thoseemanating fromthe
pro-liberalisation perspective, those coming from
an anti-liberalisation perspective and those that are
politico-structural is a rough and rather slippery
one. While some of the arguments fall relatively
neatly into these categories, most of the more
nuanced arguments present challenges to the dili-
gent categoriser. Despite these reservations, the
following attempt at categorisation is optimisti-
cally undertaken on the basis that it provides ana-
lytical assistance.
Arguments from the pro-liberalisation camp
In their purest form, criticisms of the WTO from the
pro-liberalisation camp tend to be predicated on
the basis of the economic doctrine of comparative
advantage. The doctrine, which was developed in
the work of nineteenth-century classical econom-
ists,2 argues that optimal allocation of international
resourceswillbeachievedifeachcountryproduces
only the commodities that it can most efficiently
produce, and trades those commodities with other
countries in order to obtain the commodities that it
does not produce.3 There are a number of difficult-
ies in using the doctrine of comparative advantage
asaspiritualguidefor thedevelopmentof theworld
trading system. Foremost among these is the fact
that it has always been unclear whether the doc-
trine is prescriptive or merely descriptive of the
process of international trade.4 Even if the doctrine
is capable of being used prescriptively, problems
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1. See CAFOD, The Cancu´n Ministerial Meeting,
September 2003: What Happened? What Does it Mean for
Development?, Submission to the International Develop-
ment Select Committee, September 2003, www.cafod.
org.uk/policy.
2. e.g. D. Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation (1817), reissued as The Works and Correspon-
dence of David Ricardo (Straffa ed., 1951), Vol.1.
3. For an analysis of this doctrine, see J. Leonard, Pol-
lution and the Struggle for the World Product: Multi-
national Corporations, Environment and International
Comparative Advantage (1998), Ch.1.
4. As Leonard notes, n.3 above, p.1: ‘‘A ... neutral way of
thinking about the concept of comparative advantage is
that it describes the array of social, economic and political
forces that account for the general export and import
patterns prevailing between nations.’’
arise about its current applicability. The efficiency
and welfare advantages predicted by the doctrine
are based upon the movement of commodities, in
the form of raw materials and manufactured goods,
across borders. The twentieth century, however,
marked an increase in the movement of the means
of production across borders. This generally occurs
by means of foreign direct investment by multi-
national enterprises, which establish subsidiary
undertakings in another country for this purpose.
The prevalence of foreign direct investment, which
is facilitated by the WTO agreements, appears to
raise some questions about the current applic-
ability of the doctrine of comparative advantage as
a prescription.5 Furthermore, it seems unlikely that
the doctrine of comparative advantage is capable of
addressing the current comparative disadvantage
of developing countries.
Despite the shortcomings of the doctrine of com-
parative advantage, a prevalent criticism of the
WTO is that it is incapable of realising the benefits
promised by the doctrine because, rhetoric aside, it
is not really concerned with removing barriers to
international trade. Rather, the argument goes, it is
a pretext for keeping up protectionist barriers in
some areas. In particular, it is argued that the WTO
rules are dedicated to keeping up protectionist
barriers for the developed world so that enterprises
based in the developed world have access to
the markets they want, while enterprises of the
developing world do not have access to the markets
of the developed world that would be particularly
valuable to them. A version of this argument was a
central concern of the Cancu´n Ministerial Confer-
ence,where thedevelopingcountrieswerepushing
for reductions in developed-country subsidies for
domestic agricultural production and in developed-
country tariffs in order to improve developing-
country ability to compete in world agricultural
markets. The failure of the developed world to
make concessions, even on the specific issue of
access to the international cotton markets,6 starkly
illustrates this particular criticism of the WTO. It is
clear, however, that what developing countrieswant
and need is a more equitable system of trade liberal-
isation and not unfettered liberalisation. This is
evident in developing-country arguments for im-
proved systems of Special and Differential Treat-
ment (SDT).7 It is also clear that their resistance at
Cancu´n to the so-called Singapore issues8 was not
merely due to the need to take an aggressive nego-
tiating position in order to bolster their arguments
about access to agricultural and textile markets.
Developingcountriesareclearlyapprehensiveabout
the conclusion, in particular, of a WTO Multilateral
Investment Agreement (MIA),9 which they consider
would further compromise not only their ability to
control their economy but also their sovereignty.
This concern is clearly related to more general anti-
liberalisation objections to the WTO and is con-
sidered in more detail below.
While some developed countries stood in the
way of significant liberalised concessions in
agriculture and textiles, it is clear that developed
countries in general were unhappy with the out-
come of the Cancu´n Ministerial Conference be-
cause of the failure to secure greater liberalisation
in relation to the Singapore issues.10 There is con-
siderable evidence to suggest that the implosion of
the Ministerial Conference was a consequence not
of the disputes over agriculture and textiles, but of
the aggressive pursuit by the developed countries
of agreement to proceed towards the conclusion of
an MIA.11 As noted above, this was resisted by
developing countries. For reasons that are further
exploredbelow, it isalso likely tobea focalpoint for
staunch resistance by activists and campaigners
around the world. The controversy does, however,
illustrate the point that the developed countries
have a somewhat schizophrenic position on trade
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5. SeeF. Macmillan, WTOand theEnvironment (Sweet&
Maxwell, 2001), pp.226–230.
6. This issue was raised by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad
and Mali: see WTO, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative
in Favour of Cotton—Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali (WT/MIN(03)/W/2, 15/8/03); and
WTO, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour
of Cotton—Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad
andMali—Addendum (WT/MIN(03)/W/2/Add.1,3/9/03).
Despite support in Cancu´n from Argentina, Australia,
Bangladesh (on behalf of Least Developed Countries),
Bangladesh, Cameroon, Canada, Guinea, India, Senegal
andSouthAfrica,aswellasthepersonal interventionof the
WTOdirector-generalSupachaiPanitchpakdi,noprogress
was made on this issue due to opposition and/or obfus-
cation from the United States and the European Union: see
WTO, Cancu´n Ministerial Conference: Summary of 10
September 2003 (www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_
e/min03_e/min03_10sept_e.htm, accessed September 12,
2003); WTO, Cancu´n Ministerial Conference: Summary
of 11 September 2003 (www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min03_e/min03_11sept_e.htm, accessed Sept-
ember 12, 2003); WTO, Cancu´n Ministerial Conference:
Summary of 12 September 2003 (www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_12sept_e.htm,
accessed September 13, 2003).
7. See Christian Aid, ‘‘Recipe for Disaster 2: Special and
Differential Treatment’’, Recipe for Disaster: Cancu´n
Briefing Papers/09.03, www.christian-aid.org.uk/cancun/
briefing.htm (accessed September 12, 2003). The concept
of SDT has itself come under attack from those advocating
a more rigorous liberalisation of international trade: see,
e.g. H. Nottage, ‘‘Trade and Competition in the WTO:
Pondering the Applicability of Special and Differential
Treatment’’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Economic
Law 23.
8. The Singapore issues, so named because they were left
over from the First WTO Ministerial Conference in
Singapore, are investment, competition, government pro-
curement and trade facilitation (customs restrictions).
9. See e.g. WTO Working Group on the Relationship
between Trade and Investment, Communication from
China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan and Zimbabwe: In-
vestors’ and Home Governments’ Obligations (WT/WGTI/
W/152, 19/11/02).
10. See CAFOD, n.1 above.
11. See Cancu´n Ministerial Conference: Summary of 14
September 2003 (www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_
e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm, accessed September 26,
2003).
liberalisation. In general, it may be possible to
characterise them as more in favour of an
undifferentiated (‘‘one size fits all’’) approach to
trade liberalisation, but their failure to make sig-
nificant compromises on market access suggests
a qualified embrace of the pro-liberalisation
position.
Overall, anextremepro-liberalisationpositionis
not only theoretically questionable as a result of its
reliance on the doctrine of comparative advantage;
it is also evident that it is not embraced by any
member state of the WTO. On the other hand, there
is clearly some basis for the argument that in some
respects, the WTO is ‘‘too protectionist’’. Given that
the negative effects of this are largely experienced
by developing countries, which (in the main) do
not advocate ‘‘one size fits all’’ liberalisation, it
may well be that this objection is more politico-
structural than purely pro-liberalisation.
Arguments from the anti-liberalisation camp
Like the pro-liberalisation camp, the anti-liberalis-
ation camp is very broad. In many respects, the
main anti-liberalisation arguments are politico-
structural in the sense that they are concerned
with trade liberalisation in the form that it takes
under the auspices of the WTO. The basis on which
the anti-liberalisation arguments are separated
from those categorised as politico-structural is
that the former are concerned with the internal
political economy of the WTO, whereas the latter
are concerned with its position in the architecture
of international law and politics.
The most extreme anti-liberalisation argument
against the WTO is that, being dedicated to the goal
of free international trade, it is an instrument of
global capitalism. This is the familiar argument of
many anti-capitalist, anti-globalisation activists.
Not only is the embrace of capitalism decried on
the basis of adverse welfare effects, it is also con-
demned for its inherent instability. In a traditional
Marxist analysis, the production of surplus value
means that capital must always look for new mar-
kets in order to realise its surplus value. However,
the realisation of surplus value requires capitalis-
ation of that value by turning the new market into a
new site of capitalist production. Eventually, how-
ever, the whole world will be a capitalist market
and there will be nowhere new to go, which will
lead to crisis and paradigm shift.12
An argument that owes much to the influence of
Marxist theory, but which lays claim to greater
popularity among those critical of the WTO, is
that the WTO’s free-trade mandate means that it is
dedicated to the promotion of the interests of
multinational business enterprises over the
interestsof individuals.13 This argumentpostulates
that the positions taken by the developed countries
within the WTO are a consequence of the close
relationship between governments and business
enterprises in Western-style liberal democracies.
Certainly, when one considers the provisions of the
major new Uruguay Round agreements, the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (the TRIPs Agreement)14 and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (the
GATS),15 it is hard to escape the conclusion that
the direct primary beneficiaries of these agree-
ments are international business enterprises. It
is unsurprising, therefore, that the focus of
developing-country ire with respect to the oper-
ation of the WTO agreements is frequently
multinational enterprise. Examples of this abound,
and include, in relation to the TRIPs Agreement,
the pharmaceutical corporations,16 in relation to
the GATS, the privatised water corporations,17
and in relation to the Agreement on Agriculture,
international agribusiness.18
At Cancu´n, concerns about the way in which the
WTO agreements facilitate the increase in inter-
national corporate power found particular voice in
relation to the Singapore issues. These issues, left
over for resolution from the First Singapore Minis-
terial Conference, are investment, competition,
government procurement and trade facilitation
(customs barriers), but the greatest of these is in-
vestment.Eversince thesuspensionofnegotiations
over the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment, the developed countries have pushed for an
approach at the WTO that would secure what they
consider to be the benefits of such an agreement.
This strategy is a clear manifestation of the identity
of interest that exists between the governments of
developed countries and the multinational corpor-
ate sector. As with progressive liberalisation in
the services sector under the auspices of the GATS,
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12. See, further, M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (Harvard
University Press, 2000), pp.221–239.
13. See, e.g. Macmillan, n.5 above, p.226.
14. On the way in which the corporate sector drove the
US positionon thenegotiationof theTRIPs Agreement, see
M. Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), Ch.1.
15. On the relationship between GATS and the articu-
lation of corporate power, see F. Macmillan, ‘‘Making
Corporate Power Global’’ (1999) 5 International Trade
Law and Regulation 3.
16. See, e.g. P. Drahos, ‘‘Intellectual Property and Human
Rights’’ (1999) 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly 349.
17. See,e.g.D. Fernandes, ‘‘Suez’WorldWater Wars:The
Skirmish at the WTO over Privatization’’, CorpWatch,
September 9, 2003 (www.corpwatch.org/issues/PRT.jsp?
articleid=8390, accessed 12 September 2003). See, further,
Macmillan, n.5 above, Ch.7.
18. See, e.g. Russo, ‘‘Will Agricultural Issues Derail
WTO Talks?’’, CorpWatch, September 10, 2003 (www.
corpwatch.org/issues/PRT.jsp?articleid=8408, accessed
September 12, 2003). Cf. S.L. Boyd, W.A. Kerr and N.
Perdikis, ‘‘Agricultural Biotechnology Innovations versus
Intellectual Property Rights: Are Developing Countries at
the Mercy of Multinationals?’’ (2003) 6 Journal of World
Intellectual Property 212.
the greatest beneficiaries of an MIA would be
multinational enterprises.19 This is essentially be-
cause liberalisation in the supply of services and in
investment facilitates foreign direct investment,
which is the central method by which multi-
national enterprise spreads its influence across
national borders.20 Securing foreign direct invest-
ment is important to developing countries, and is
probably high on the list of reasons why most
developing countries seek to become members of
the WTO. However, the Cancu´n Conference shows
that developing countries have come to see that
foreign direct investment is not an unalloyed
good.21
The resistance of developing countries at Cancu´n
toaWTOMIAmayplausiblyberegardedas, inpart,
based upon a position taken in November 2002 by
China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan and Zimbabwe
in a Communication to the WTO Working Group on
the Relationship between Trade and Investment.22
This Communication deals with the behaviour of
multinational enterprises as the primary source of
foreign direct investment. Of multinational enter-
prises, the Communication notes:
‘‘They command enormous physical and financial
resources, including proprietary technology and
world-wide recognition of their brand or trade names.
Their global scale of operations give them unique
ability to respond to exchange rate movements in any
part of the world, minimise their global tax bill and
circumvent financial restrictions imposed by govern-
ments, ability to minimise the political risks, access to
information on world markets and the ability to bar-
gain with the potential host countries from a position
of strength arising from their global position.’’23
TheCommunicationpointsout that,althoughthere
has been some emphasis in the WTO discussions
on an MIA on the rights of foreign investors in host
countries, there has been little reflection on their
obligations. Thus, the signatory countries call for
the imposition, within the context of a WTO MIA,
of obligations on multinational enterprises based
on four general principles, as follows:
 foreign investors would respect the national
sovereignty of the host member and the right
of each member government to regulate and
monitor their activities;
 non-interference in internalaffairsof thehost
member and in its determination of its eco-
nomic and other priorities;
 adherence to economic goals and develop-
ment objectives, policies and priorities of
host members, and working seriously towards
making a positive contribution to the achieve-
ment of the host members’ economic goals,
development policies and objectives; and
 adherence to socio-cultural objectives and
values, and avoiding practices, products or
services that may have detrimental effects.24
According to the Communication, these general
principles should be backed up by specific obli-
gations in theareasof restrictivebusinesspractices,
technology transfer, effect on balance of payments,
ownership and control, consumer and environ-
mental protections, disclosure and accounting,
and the obligations of the home governments of
multinational enterprises.25
This position reflects that of scholars and other
commentators who have expressed concern about
the rise of unaccountable global corporate power as
aconsequence of loweringnationalbarriers to trade
and investment and giving ‘‘rights’’ to the private
sector that are not mirrored by obligations nor by
equivalent ‘‘rights’’ for national governments or
individuals.26 Part and parcel of this concern is
the adjustment in the nature and scope of national
sovereignty in the wake of economic liberalisation.
It now seems hardly controversial to express these
concerns. The recognition in the international
community of a need to regulate the exercise of
power by multinational and transnational business
enterprises dates back, at least, to the 1976 OECD
Declaration on International Investment and Multi-
national Enterprises. This concern seems to have
gained a new urgency in the twenty-first century,
which has seen the promulgation in close suc-
cession of a new version of the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises,27 the United Nations
Global Compact,28 and the United Nations Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpor-
ations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights.29 The first two of these initiatives
are hortatory and voluntary.30 The new United
Nations Norms are written in mandatory language
and address themselves both to transnational busi-
ness enterprises and to states. This very worthy
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19. See, further, Macmillan, n.15 above.
20. See Leonard, n.3 above, Ch.1; and Macmillan, n.5
above, pp. 226–230.
21. On the relationship between foreign direct invest-
ment and development, see, e.g. Magee, ‘‘Information and
theMultinationalCorporation:AnAppropriabilityTheory
of Foreign Direct Investment’’ in The New International
Economic Order: The North South Debate (Bhagwati ed.,
1977);andHymer, ‘‘TheMultinationalCorporationandthe
Law of Uneven Development’’ in Economics and World
Order (Bhagwati ed., 1972).
22. n.9 above.
23. n.9 above, para.1.
24. n.9 above, para.12.
25. n.9 above, paras 13–21.
26. See, e.g. Macmillan, n.15 above.
27. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
Text, Commentary and Clarifications, DAFFE/IME/WPG
(2000)15/FINAL, 31 October 2001.
28. This is an initiative on corporate citizenship: see
www.unglobalcompact.org. The operational phase of the
Global Compact was launched on July 26, 2000.
29. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), ap-
proved August 13, 2003 by UN Sub-commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Resolution
2003/16, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 at 52 (2003).
30. See, further, WTO Working Group on the Relation-
shipbetweenTradeandInvestment,n.9above,paras3–11.
new initiative,31 however, shares two interrelated
problems with the proposals by developing
countries for investor obligations in a WTO MIA.
The first is that multinational or transnational
enterprises have risen above the regulatory control
of nation states. Accordingly, to impose regulatory
obligations on their ‘‘home’’ governments may lack
meaning in some cases. The second problem is that
the legal architecture of international law ad-
dresses itself to the constitution of power between
nation states inter se and between nation states and
international bodies. Corporate power is not recog-
nised in this constitution. This is a matter to which
this article will return.
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the
concerns about the unaccountable power of
multinational corporate actors are, in part, focused
on the effects of their behaviour with respect to
matters such as human rights, protection of the
environment and sustainable development.32 This
can, however, also be seen as part of a wider
criticism of the WTO: because free trade is the
trump card under the WTO, it ignores or overrides
other values that have a claim to recognition, such
as the protection of human rights, the protection
of the environment and the right to development.33
A reasonable argument might be made that the
Uruguay Round considerably upped the ante
here. Although by no means the only agreements
implicated in this criticism, the TRIPs Agreement,
the GATS and the new-look Agreement on
Agriculture seem to have raised particular con-
cerns in this respect.34 This criticism of the WTO
impacts with particular force on the citizens of
developing countries, but they are by no means
the only victims of the failure of the system of
international economic law properly to integrate
and recognise such fundamental rights.
Politico-structural arguments
The criticisms of the WTO that may be described as
politico-structural are mainly, but not exclusively,
concerned with the increasingly fraught split be-
tween the position of the developed and the
developing world. This fracture became particu-
larly evident at Cancu´n with the emergence of the
so-called Group of 22 developing countries, which
formed around the relatively powerful states of
Brazil, China and India. It may be argued that this
fracture is inevitable given the fact that the WTO, as
part of the system of international law, is inscribed
with the legacy of the colonial period and may,
therefore, be considered to be part of the supporting
structure of the international empire of the West.
This means that the ‘‘one size fits all’’ mentality of
the WTO is bound to perpetuate existing in-
equality. A level playing field does not ensure a
fair match when one of the teams is hobbled. The
politico-structural nub of this objection to the WTO
is that the ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach to trading
rules denies to developing countries strategic pro-
tectionist advantages that were essential to the
developed countries in securing their own econ-
omicdevelopment.35 Furthermore, theWTOisseen
as being implicated by association with the other
two institutions of international economic law, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Thus, negotiations in the WTO are taking
place in the harsh lightof the parlous consequences
for some developing countries of the structural
adjustment policies of the IMF and the World
Bank.36 Despite the hostility and accusations of
post-colonial imperialism quite reasonably engen-
dered by some of the activities of the IMF37 and the
World Bank,38 the WTO does little to distance itself
from them.39
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31. See, further, F. Macmillan, ‘‘Regulating Multinational
Enterprises’’ (2003) 24 The Company Lawyer 355.
32. See, e.g. WTO Working Group on the Relationship
between Trade and Investment, n.9 above, para.19;
Macmillan, n.5 above, Ch.8; and Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and Trade
(Paper for the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancu´n,
Mexico, September 10–14, 2003), pp.16–19.
33. See, e.g. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, n.32 above; and Macmillan, n.5 above.
34. On TRIPs and human rights, see, e.g. Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, n.32 above, pp.7–9, 14–
16; M. Blakeney, ‘‘Intellectual Property Rights and Global
Food Security’’ (2000–01) 5 Bioscience Law Review 127;
and Drahos, n.16 above. On TRIPs, the environment
and sustainable development, see, e.g. M. Blakeney,
‘‘Biotechnology, TRIPs and the Convention on Biological
Diversity’’ (1998–99) 4 Bioscience Law Review 144; G.
Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and
Biodiversity (2000); and F. Macmillan, ‘‘The World Trade
Organisation and the Transfer of Environmentally Sound
Technologies’’ (2001) 7 International Trade Law and Regu-
lation 178. On TRIPs and development, see, e.g. Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.32 above,
pp.7–9. On GATS, human rights and development, see,
e.g. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
n.32 above, pp.6–7, 11–13; and N. Klein, No Logo (Fla-
mingo, 2001), Chs 9–11. On GATS, the environment and
sustainable development, see, e.g. Macmillan, n.5 above,
Ch.7; and F. Macmillan, ‘‘The World Trade Organization
and the Regulation of Trade in Environmental Services’’
(2001) 7 International Trade Law and Regulation 127.
On the Agreement on Agriculture, human rights and
sustainable development, see, e.g. Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, n.32 above, pp.9–11; and M.
Ritchie, ‘‘WTO, Food and Agricultural Rules: Sustainable
Agriculture and the Human Right to Food’’ (2000) 9
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 9.
35. See, e.g. Blakeney, n.14 above, pp.157–166; and
Christian Aid, ‘‘Recipe for Disaster 1: The ‘Development
Round’’’ inChristianAid,n.7above.AstheNGO,Christian
Aid, pithily puts it, ‘‘Making trade work for economic
development is not the same as liberalising trade’’: ibid.
36. See, e.g. Christian Aid, ‘‘Recipe for Disaster 3:
Agriculture’’ in Christian Aid, n.7 above.
37. See, e.g. S. Pahuja, ‘‘Technologies of Empire: IMF
Conditionality and the Reinscription of the North/South
Divide’’ [2000] Leiden Journal of International Law 749.
38. For an overview of some of these activities, see J.
Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Allen Lane,
2002).
39. Note e.g. WTO, ‘‘Ministerial Declaration: 14 November
2001’’ (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20/11/01) (‘‘the Doha Declar-
ation’’),para.5: ‘‘WeshallcontinuetoworkwiththeBretton
The specific developing-country response to
this structural issue of entrenched inequality is to
call for an enhanced SDT system. The Doha Declar-
ation, which emerged from the Fourth Ministerial
Conference, made reference to a proposed Frame-
work Agreement on Special and Differential Treat-
ment40 and providedthat ‘‘all specialand differential
treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view
to strengthening them and making them more pre-
cise, effective and operational’’.41 In particular,
developing countries have pushed for a move from
ahortatory toamandatoryapproach toSDT.42 In the
wake of Doha, the WTO’s Trade and Development
Committee were charged with taking forward the
work on SDT. By the time of the Cancu´n Ministerial
Conference, 88 proposals had been made, upon 24
of which agreement seemed possible. Inevitably, in
addition to being numerically paltry, these pro-
posals offered few real benefits to most developing
countries. No clear agreement on improving the
SDT regime seems to have been reached.
The apparent structural bias of the WTO in
favour of developed countries has also manifested
itself inanumberofothercriticisms.Brief reference
to three of these criticisms constitutes a useful
indication of the range of concern. First, it is argued
that powerful member states of the WTO have used
WTO obligations as a bottom line for making bilat-
eral agreements with other less powerful member
states that impose higher obligations on those
states.43 Secondly, critics point to the way in which
those same powerful member states simply refuse
to take notice of WTO rules in some circumstances.
A telling example of this was the refusal by the
United States to allow its Helms Burton Act, im-
posing trade sanctions on Cuba, to become the
subject of a WTO dispute resolution on the ground
that the Act was related to its national security and,
therefore, not justiciable before the WTO dispute
settlement body.44 The third argument concerning
the tendency of powerful states to take advantage of
their power within the WTO system is that,
although it is said to be a rule-based system, the
rules do not work the same way for all members.
The US approach to the taking of compulsory
licences under Art.31 of the TRIPs Agreement pro-
vides a useful illustration. After four people in the
United States died as a result of exposure to an-
thrax, the US government declared that it would
take a compulsory licence of a patented anti-anthrax
medication under Art.31.45 However, despite the
deaths of millions of people as a result of AIDS-
related illnesses in sub-Saharan Africa, the United
States resisted the use of Art.31 by African national
governments in respect of anti-AIDS retrovirals.
The fact that the US government backtracked on
the anti-anthrax compulsory licence does little to
undermine the suggestion of inconsistent appli-
cation of the rules.
Criticisms of the WTO that focus on the struc-
tural division between the developed and the
developing world are to a considerable extent
subsumed in a much more general structural criti-
cism, which is that the WTO is not democratic. In
many ways, the foregoing discussion might be
regarded as a demonstration of this argument. If
the WTO is democratic, how can it be that the 30 or
so developed countries, out of a total membership
of 146, call the shots? Of course, this phenomenon
might be explained by, among other things, the fact
that developing countries take different positions
on different issues and do not, therefore, vote
effectively as a bloc. It appears to be the case, for
example, that at the Cancu´n Ministerial Confer-
ence, three distinct groupings of developing
countries were in evidence.46 A lingering suspicion
about the WTO’s democratic credentials, neverthe-
less, remains.
The WTO defends its democratic credentials on
the basis that decisions made by the WTO are based
on consensus, arrived at through the debate and
agreement of the representatives of the national
governments of countries that are members of
the WTO.47 Even at this level, there is something
slightly disingenuous about the argument. The
WTO admits, in somewhat of an understatement,
that ‘‘[it] would be wrong to suggest that every
country has the same bargaining power’’.48 How-
ever, in this context, it does not seem to take on
board the fact that ‘‘bargaining power’’ is not the
whole story when it comes to exerting influence
over WTO decisions. Being able to attend meetings
of the WTO General Council and to wield
diplomatic influence at the WTO is also clearly
important. Something that particularly militates
against the exercise of influence by poorer coun-
tries is the cost of maintaining a permanent del-
egation in Geneva. Perhaps this explains why, in
the face of opposition before Cancu´n by over 60
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developing countries,49 the Singapore issues found
their way onto the Cancu´n agenda. Of course, the
WTO knows that difficulties in funding a Genevan
presence create an influence deficit.50 However,
even if it were able adequately to address this
problem, it would still not be getting to the nub of
the allegation that it is not democratic.
When people criticise the WTO for being un-
democratic, what they are referring to is what
Stiglitz has characterised as ‘‘global governance
without global government’’, that is, ‘‘one in which
a few institutions the World Bank, the IMF, and the
WTO and a few players the finance, commerce and
trade ministers, closely linked to certain financial
and commercial interests dominate the scene, but
in which many of those affected by their decisions
are left almost voiceless’’.51 Two factors explain
how the WTO forms part of this ‘‘global governance
without global government’’ and why the involve-
ment of ‘‘finance, commerce and trade ministers’’
has made so little impact on its democratic creden-
tials. These factors are, first, the relationship be-
tween the WTO and capital, and secondly, the
relationship between nation states and capital.
The WTO may be regarded as representing the
interests of capital in the sense that the WTO has a
reciprocal relationship with multinational enter-
prises under which their activities are facilitated
through progressive trade liberalisation while at
the same time they act as instruments of the WTO’s
(rhetorical, at least) goal of free international trade.
This has accelerated the process by which the
power of multinational enterprise has become
global, while the countervailing political power of
the democratic entities has remained trapped
within the confines of the nation state. Thus, multi-
national enterprises may be regarded as having
transcended what Hardt and Negri refer to as ‘‘the
constitutional command of the nation states’’.52 It is
important to recognise that not only are nation
states politically eclipsed by the power of the inter-
national corporate sector, but they have also ceased
to resist. They have, in truth, been captured by the
ideology of capital. One might even take the argu-
ment a step further and say they are controlled by
it.53 Of course, this goes a little further than the
observation made above that in Western liberal
democracies, the relationship between the state
and the ‘‘private’’ sector is very close. On the other
hand, it goes some way to explaining the willing co-
operation of nation states with a system of inter-
national economic law apparently dedicated to a
form of trade and financial market liberalisation
regardless of its consequences for millions of
people and regardless of its insistence on the irrel-
evance of national borders.54 A question that per-
haps remains is, if the power of multinational
enterprise is no longer constitutionalised within
the political entity of the nation state, is it possible
or desirable to regard it as being constitutionalised
through the mechanisms of this WTO or any suc-
cessor WTO?55
Then what?
Absent global catastrophe, whether this WTO exists
tomorrow or not, it is most unlikely that inter-
national trade will cease, that developing countries
will rectify their position of historical inequality
or that multinational enterprise will abandon the
powerful global position that it has carved out for
itself. This WTO may have been responsible for
exacerbatingall these problems.However, forall its
faults, not only will the abolition of this WTO
without any successor, except the free market, fail
to improve thepresentsituation, itmaywellmakeit
worse. We do, indeed, need trade rules. The real
question is whether we can do a better job with
them. The criticisms of this WTO from the pro- and
anti-liberalisation perspective might be regarded
as largely addressing questions of how any new or
revised trade rules might strike the balance be-
tween free trade and protectionism in order to serve
certaincountervailingvalues.Thepolitico-structural
criticisms, especially when viewed cumulatively
with the anti-liberalisationarguments, starkly raise
two particular problems that need to be addressed
as a matter of urgency. One is the position of the
developing world, and the other is the apparently
unregulated power of the multinational sector.
How,then,doweintroducecountervailingvalues
into the system of international economic law as
represented by WTO law? Is there a way of con-
stitutionalising power at the international level
that reflects the types of values that most people
areusuallyconcernedaboutwhentheycomplainof
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(Princeton University Press, 1977, reprinted 1997), which
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democratic deficit: voice, representation, trans-
parency?56 Looking around for a source of values
with countervailing force to the value of the market
as enshrined in WTO law, one is inevitably drawn,
as a moth to a flame, to public international law.
Might a rapprochement, or even a reconciliation,
between the divided systems of international eco-
nomic law and public international law constitute
the beginnings of a solution?
The current international legal order, which has
emerged since the end of the Second World War,
embraces a kind of schism between international
economic law and public international law.57 From
the beginning, the mandates of these two systems
were distinct. The system of international econ-
omic law grew up around the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, of which the WTO is a progeny.58 These
institutions were to manage international econ-
omic relations. The Dumbarton Oaks institutions
were tomanage the internationalpolitical order. As
part of this mandate, the Dumbarton Oaks insti-
tutions and the system of public international law
that has been built up around them have purported
to establish international standards in areas such as
human rights and the protection of the environ-
ment. Legally, there was, and remains, little in the
way of linkage between the two systems. Despite
this legal separation, their institutions and activi-
ties have a clear, if changing, interrelationship.
That is, there is a wide range of matters within the
purview of the international legal system that have
an impact in both the system of international econ-
omic law and the system of public international
law.59 Institutionally,FingerandTamiottihavenoted
a ‘‘rearrangement, which makes international
public institutions regroup around three key issues
... security, sustainable development and trade
regulation’’.60 The Integrated Framework for
Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least De-
veloped Countries, which is a joint venture be-
tween the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO,
UNCTAD, UNDP and the International Trade
Centre,61 provides a useful example of this. Never-
theless, there are no legal connections between the
two systems. Rather than speaking to each other, it
is often suggested that the two systems are in some
sort of regulatory competition in which inter-
national economic law, especially WTO law, is
ascendant ‘‘with economics replacing politics as
law’s sidekick and nemesis’’.62
Given the actual overlap in the impact of inter-
national economic law and public international
law, it would seem logical for the systems to inter-
sect legally. More than merely having the appeal of
logic (a little-regarded value in law), from the point
of view of international economic law, many of the
abuses that are said to be inherent in the current
WTO system might be answered by a form of legal
recourse to norms established in public inter-
national law. This might be particularly so, for
example, in relation to human rights and environ-
mental matters. From the point of view of public
international law, its serious problem withenforce-
ment might be addressed through a legal relation-
ship with international economic law.63 Most
importantly, however, rapprochement of the two
systems would involve a recognition that the inter-
national economic order is part of the international
political order. It is evident that, despite the
strength of the politico-structural criticisms of the
WTO, canvassed above, this point is little appreci-
ated. For example, in a speech made just after the
Cancu´n Ministerial Conference, the deputy direc-
tor-general of the WTO, referring to the plight of the
cotton farmers from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and
Mali,64 said the farmers ‘‘do not ask for aid, which is
the World Bank’s remit, nor do they make political
appeals that belong to the United Nations’’.65 As
discussed above, however, the position of these
countries (and their nationals) is a consequence of
a structural imbalance in power. Surely, such an
imbalance is related to the international political
order.
Would a recognition that the international econ-
omic order is part of the international political
order be the key to a more just and democratic
reconstitutionalisation of power at the inter-
national level? This raises a thorny problem if that
recognition is realised, as suggested above, through
the creation of a legal relationship between the
systems of international economic law and public
international law.This isbecause thesystemsshare
a twofold myopia. First, both systems fail to give
any formal or constitutional recognition to so-
called ‘‘private actors’’ in the form of multinational
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enterprises. Secondly, neither system appears to be
sufficiently concerned about the extent to which
power might be exercised outside the cognisance
or jurisdiction of the nation state. It is clear that if
one were to recast the law of the world trading
system so that it directly intersected with, and was
constrained by, the values of public international
law, many of the criticisms of the current WTO
system would be on their way to being addressed.
However, one overriding concern would remain.
This is the issue of the constitutionalisation of
international corporate, or ‘‘private’’, power. That
is, the question of how the power of the multi-
national corporate sector is to be controlled and
regulated within a system of law that both recog-
nises the existence of that power and is not in-
capable in the face of it.
If it is truly the case that multinational
enterprises are outside the constitutional com-
mand of the nation state, then given the myopia of
both systems of international law with respect to
non-state actors, even laudable initiatives like the
United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations66 are doomed to rather
limited effect. Of course, it might be argued that the
very existence of these Norms demonstrates an
emerging concern within public international law
with respect to the exercise of international corpor-
ate power. If so, cross-fertilisation of this concern
into international economic law would be desir-
able.What isclear is that, inorder toanswersome of
the most penetrating criticisms of the system of
international economic law embodied in the cur-
rent WTO, any revised system must concern itself
not only with regulating the exercise of power
betweenstates,butalsowithregulating theexercise
of corporate power at the international level.
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